Using recently discovered archival data, this article studies the changes in the Soviet population and the urbanization patterns after the 1933 famine. It documents that, although most of the direct victims lived in the rural areas, the famine is associated with a persistent negative change in the urban population. In fact, the rural population gradually recovered while urban settlements in more affected areas became permanently smaller. The paper shows that these changes were not planned in the First Five-Year Plan (1928--1933), but that subsequent plans may have incorporated and exacerbated the differences in urbanization that occurred during the years of rural crisis. The paper argues that the shortage of labor during the crucial years of rapid industrialization hindered the development of cities in areas stricken by the famine. Thus, the timing of the shock to population appears to be important. While established urban networks tend to recover from large temporary negative shocks, the lack of people during construction and rapid growth might have a permanent negative impact. 

Draft: SSRN

This chapter summarizes the recent research on pre-WWII Soviet industrialization. It shows that (1) collectivization of agriculture served primarily to extract resources for the command-style industrialization, not to increase agricultural productivity, (2) the government policies --- collectivization and grain procurement --- and not weather or other natural causes created the 1933 famine, (3) these policies were implemented with a systematic bias against ethnic Ukrainians, (4) command-style industrialization was not the most efficient way to industrialize, but it was the only way consistent with the Bolshevik ideology, (5) industrialization reduced living standards for both workers and peasants, but relatively more for peasants, and (6) the policies implemented during industrialization led to persistent changes in the economy, political preferences, and social behavior.

Draft

Data Appendix

Replication files

We study the role of organized crime in the outcomes of mass privatization during Russia's transition to a market economy in the 1990s. Although privatization aimed to create a broad class of private owners and jumpstart capitalism, it was implemented amid a profound institutional void and state weakness. Using the prevalence of thieves-in-law — elite figures in Russia’s criminal underworld — as a measure of organized crime presence, and leveraging exogenous variation from the 1953 Gulag amnesty, we find that provinces with higher criminal presence (1) exhibited greater firm creation, (2) achieved higher privatization rates, and (3) showed improved firm-level productivity. These findings suggest that criminal networks substituted for missing formal institutions by facilitating market activity and protecting property rights.

draft coming soon

From 1964 to 1988 more than a hundred underground industrial nuclear explosions were made all over the Soviet Union: to stimulate oil production, to create underground cavities for gas storage, to perform Earth seismic sounding, etc. Using a panel of 3,000 Russian towns and cities, we show that urban population near the explosions increased statistically significantly, although the effect is economically small, consistent with nuclear explosions being another form of investment. Using a cross-section of 25,000 Russian municipalities from 2008 to 2020 we find no increase in mortality rates near the explosions sites.